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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAYTON CITY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent Case No. 16659 
vs. 
FERRIN DOUGLAS GLINES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Ferrin Douglas Glines, was convicted before 
the Circuit Court of the State of Utah, in and for Layton, Utah, 
of the crime of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, in 
violation of Section 41-6-44, Layton Municipal Code. Upon appeal 
to the Second Judicial District Court, that judgment of conviction 
was upheld by the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, Judge, Presiding. 
From that judgment of conviction, the defendant brought a direct 
appeal pursuant to the terms and provisions of Article VIII, Section 
9, of the Constitution of the State of Utah solely and expressly to 
test the Constitutional validity and construction of Layton 
~unic1pal Code 41-6-44. 
-1-
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court found the defendant guilty of the crime o: 
Driving under the influence of alcohol, in violation of Layton 
Municipal Code, Section 41-6-44. Subsequently, the trial court 
sentenced appellant to serve a term of six months in the Davis 
County Jail. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the verdict and judgment of th: 
trial court upon grounds that Section 41-6-44, Layton Municipa: 
Code is invalid. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent, Layton City, concurs with Appellant's Statemen: 
of Facts. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
REPEAL OF SECTION 41-6-43, u.c.A. (1953) 
DID NOT INVALIDATE SECTION 41-6-44 OF THE 
LAYTON MUNICIPAL CODE. 
A. Layton City enacted Section 41-6-44, pursuant t~ 
state statutes. 
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Respondent agrees with Appellant that Section 41-6-43 
was repealed by the Utah State Legislature, but Section 41-6-44 
of the Revised Ordinances of Layton City under which the Defendant 
was charged and convicted was not enacted solely upon the authority 
of Section 41-6-43. The position of Respondent is that Section 
41-6-44 was enacted pursuant to authority granted under various 
state statutes including Section 10-8-84, U.C.A., (1953), which 
provides the following: 
They may pass all ordinances and rules and 
make all regulations, not repugnant to law, 
necessary for carrying into effect or discharging 
all powers and duties conferred by this chapter, 
and such are necessary and proper to provide for 
the safety and preserve the health, and promote 
the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and 
good order, comfort and convenience of the city 
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the 
protection of property therein; and may enforce 
obedience to such ordinances with such fines 
or penalties as they may deem proper; provided, 
that the punishment of any offense shall be by 
fine in any sum less than $300 or by imprison-
ment not to exceed six months, or by both such 
fine and imprisonment. 
In addition, it should be noted that Section 41-6-16, 
U.C.A., (1953), at the beginning of the traffic code states: 
The provisions of this act shall be applicable 
and uniform throughout this state and in all 
political subdivisions and municipalities therein 
and no local authority shall ena~t or enforc~ ~ny 
rule or regulation in conflict with. the prov~sions 
of this act unless expressly authorized herei~. 
Local authorities may, however, adopt regula~i?ns 
consistent with this act, and addi~ional tra~fic 
regulations which are not in conflict therewith. 
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"'1 
Therefore, the repeal of Section 41-6-43 does not 
affect municipal power to adopt an ordinance contain1·ng 1 anguag1 
substantially similar to Sections 41-6-44 and 41-6-45, as 
Section 41-6-16 specifically enables municipalities to adopt 
and enforce rules and regulations consistent with Chapter 6 of 
Title 41, Utah Code Annotated and "additional traffic regulatio~ 
not in conflict therewith." 
Additionally, Section 10-3-710, U.C.A., (1953) 
Sup. 1977) provides that municipalities may adopt provisions of 
state law by reference. Section 10-1-103, U.C.A., (1953) (Sup. 
1977) provides: 
The powers herein delegated to any municipality 
shall be liberally construed to permit the municip· 
ality to exercise the powers granted by this act 
except in cases clearly contrary to the intent of 
the law. 
Also, Section 10-8-11, U.C.A. (1953), specifically 
authorizes cities to "regulate the use of streets" and Section 
10-8-30, U.C.A. (1953), authorizes cities to "regulate the 
movement of traffic on the streets." Section 10-8-47, U.C.A., 
(1953), provides that cities may prevent 1intoxication. 
Thus, Section 41-6-43, U.C.A., (1953), was not the 
only state statute from which the Respondent derived authority 
to enact its ordinance prohibiting driving while under the 
influence of intoxicating 1 iquor. There is value in general 
h · d · 1 h general grants are limited grants of aut or1ty an unt1 sue 
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by other state statutes, as in the Speth case, then the general 
grant of authority is valid and cities can pass ordinances 
under that general umbrella of authority. 
Appellant argues that once a specific power statute 
has been enacted which limits the authority given by a general 
power statute and that specific authority has been repealed, 
"one cannot resurrect it under the guise of general authority." 
Respondent does not agree. The purpose of a specific statute 
may be to limit the authority which exists from the general 
statute. But, once this limitation is removed, all the power 
and authority which originally existed under the general statute 
returns. 
B. Legislative intent in repealing Section 41-6-43 was to 
clarify the language and not to deprive cities of their right 
to regulate driving under the influence and reckless driving. 
The legislative counsel and legislative analyst to the 
Transportation Subcommittee have advised the Utah League of Cities 
and Towns' legal counsel that it was the legislative intent in 
repealing Section 41-6-43 to remove from the Utah Code language 
which was inconsistent and in conflict with Sections 41-6-44 and 
41-6-45, i.e., Section 41-6-44 relating to driving under the 
influence of alcohol or of any drug, and Section 41-6-45 relating 
to reckless driving, used language to describe drunken driving 
and reckless driving other than that used in Section 41-6-43. 
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The explanation for the difference in language is that Section 
41-6-43 was enacted in 1941 and had not been amended. Sectio~. 
41-6-44 and 41-6-45 have been amended several times and refleC' 
both court interpretations of those sections and the more rece: 
scientific descriptions of the offenses. It was not the inten: 
of the legislature to remove the authority, just the inconsist, 
language. This is evidenced by the re-enactment of Section 
41-6-43 in the next legislative session. 
C. The court should not construe a general recodificatioi 
in the same light as a specific repealing statute. 
The inclination of the courts in the past has been nr· 
to use the same rules of construction for recodifications u 
for specific repealers, i.e., the general repeal should not 
invalidate the general enabling legislation of Section 41-6-10 
where the repealer was part of a 37 page "recodification." Th; 
focus of the legislature was not concentrated on the repeal~ 
Section 41-6-43, U.C.A., (1953) alone which substantiates 
Respondents argument that the loss of Section 41-6-43 was more 
cosmetic, for consistency in language. 
POINT II 
CITIES MAY ENACT DRIVING UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE ORDINANCES PURSUANT TO A 
GENERAL GRANT OF AUTHORITY. 
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A. Salt Lake City v. Kusse is controlling case law. 
In Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P. 2d 671, 
(1938), the defendant had been convicted of driving under the 
influence of an intoxicating liquor pursuant to a city ordinance 
which was identical with the state statute with minor changes 
to conform that statute to the form of a city ordinance. The 
defendant challenged the city's power under its general power 
to pass an ordinance prohibiting driving while under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor and on the theory that a state law pre-
empts a local ordinance on the same subject. 
The Supreme Court of Utah held in the Kusse Case that 
the grant of general police power to cities under the former 
equivalent statute to Section 10-8-84, U.C.A., (1953), being 
Section 15-8-84, R.S.U., (1933), authorized the city to pass an 
ordinance to prevent driving while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor. The basis for the authority was "the public 
health, safety, morals, and welfare" authority of Section 15-8-84, 
R.S.U., (1933), which is the same as our present Section 
10-8-84, U.C.A., (1953). 
In Kusse, the Court raised a question which it never 
had to answer and which could be raised again here: 
There may be some question whether Secti?n 
15-8-30 does not pertain only to the regulation 
of the actual movement of traffic and the actual 
prevention of racing and immoderate driving; th~t 
is, whether the section permits only the operation 
-7-
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on these acts as they occur without giving power 
to prevent an act or a condition which itself F 
permitted, might affect the movement of traffic · 
or be likely to result in racing or immoderate 
driving. While this seems a narrow construction 
it need not now be decided .... (97 Utah at 116). ' 
The section before the Court in Kusse concerned the power of 
municipalities to regulate the movement of traffic. The que;: 
was whether a driving under the influence ordinance was 
regulating the movement of traffic or regulating behavior wt.:: 
could effect traffic. And, if it was not directly a regulat;: 
on the movement of traffic, could the ordinance still be jw~ 
under that section because the behavior prohibited could e£fe:' 
traffic? The Court never reached those questions because the 
found authority for the ordinance under the general grant of 
authority, Section 15-8-84, R.S.U., (1933). 
Kusse is still valid law and reasoning supporting:: 
proposition that a municipality has authority pursuant to a 
general power statute to enact an ordinance~ prohibiting spec:: 
behavior. Appellant's cites are thus inapplicable to our fac: 
circumstances because this Court has already decided the is;~: 
in Kusse. 
B. The Attorney General has issued an opinion suppo~ 
Respondent's position that cities have power to enact a d_ti.S; 
under the influence ordinance. 
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. .\ppendix "A" is an opinion from the Attorney General's 
Office of th~ State of Utah dated June 7, 1978, which supports 
Respondent's position that a general grant of authority exists 
enabling cities to enact ordinances prohibiting driving while 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor without the use of 
Section 41-6-43, U.C.A., (1953). 
C. The Speth Case is not controlling case law. 
In Speth, the Supreme Court ruled the state statute 
in question limited cities by its specific working. In our 
case, in brief, no similar statute of specific wording existed 
at the time of the Appellant's offense. Section 10-8-84 and 
others which were, and still are in existence, are statutes 
of general grants of authority. 
Thus, Respondent was not going beyond the limits of 
a specific statute because there was none. Instead, Respondent's 
ordinance was pursuant to authority which it derived under the 
state statutes cited in Point One above. The issues are not the 
same as in Speth. 
POINT III 
THE SECOND ALLRED DECISION SHOWS THE STATE 
HAS NOT PRE-EMPTED THE FIELD IN RELATION 
TO THE OFFENSE OF DRIVING UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE. 
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Appellant cites the first decision by the Utah Supre 
Court in Salt Lake City v. Allred, 19 Utah 2d 254, 430 P. ZdJ 
(1967), but that case was reheard by the Court to reconsi~r 
their opinion based on the pre-emption theory. The second 
Allred decision, found in 20 Utah 2d 298, 437 P. 2d 434, (19o! 
reversed the Court's first decision. In the second decisiMt 
Court said: 
It is a well established principle in 
this state that the city has the right to 
legislate on the same subject as a state 
statute where either the general police 
power or express grant of authority is 
conferred upon the municipalities. (Listed 
citations omitted.) (437 P. 2d at 436). 
The real significance of the second Allred decision 
as it pertains to Appellant's argument that by allowing the 
offense of "D. U. I." to be punished as a Class "A "misdemeanor 
in certain instances shows the legislature intended to pre·emr 
the field is found on pages 301 and 302 under head notes 6 ani 
7 as follows: 
As to whether or not the difference of 
penalties between city ordinances and state 
statutes on the same subject creates an 
inconsistency that will invalidate the 
ordinance receives our next consideration 
and causes some difficulty. The previous 
decision in this case stated as follows: 
-10-
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"It.must be conceded that the legislature 
did not_i~tend to gra~t to cities the authority 
to prohibit acts as misdemeanors which the State 
has denounced as felonies." 
It is statedin 37 AmJur., Municipal 
Corporations, Section 165, P. 791, as follows: 
"A municipal ordinance is not in conflict 
with a statute authorizing its adoption 
because of a difference in penalties. 
Thus, further and additional penalties 
may be imposed by statute, without 
creating inconsistency and conversely, 
at least in some instances lesser 
penalties may b~ imposed by the ordinance 
for violation than by the statute without 
conflict." 
See also annotation, 138 A.L.R. 1208, 
1213. Mc uillin Munici al Cor orations, 
Section 1 .1 , ootnote 71, cites cases 
where it is held that ordinance is valid 
when it relates to same subject matter as 
state law where the ordinance prescribed 
a smaller penalty. In these cases both 
ordinance and statute are misdemeanors. 
Although we do not believe there is 
anything inherently wrong in allowing a 
local government to punish conduct 
amounting to a felony under state law 
by a municipal ordinance which is only 
a misdemeanor, nevertheless we do not 
have to decide this question since the 
case here involved, under subsection 
7 and 8 of the city ordinance, does not 
amount to a felony under any of the state 
statutes pertaining to sexual offenses. 
The elements involved in the present 
ordinance case would not be of the same 
as under the statute, or if any of the 
elements were the same or common to both, 
the statute in a felony case would require 
proof of additional elements; therefore a 
-11-
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claim of double jeopardy would not be valid 
Double jeopardy contemplates all the elements 
of an entire offense. See State v. Thatcher. 
108 Utah 63, 157 P. 2d 258. We conclude that 
the difference in enalties does not create 
an inconsistenc t at will inval1 ate t e 
or inance where t ere can e no valid claim 
of double Jeopardy. (Emphasis added.) 
Respondent agrees with this Court and believes t~ 
re-enactment of 41-6-43 by the State Legislature further s~r 
the Allred reasoning by showing that the legislature intended 
to allow cities to enact "D.U.I." ordinances even though they 
are limited to a Class "B" misdemeanor level of punishment. 
In a prior decision, Salt LakeCity v. Kusse, 97 Uta' 
113, 93 P. 2d 673, with respect to the pre-emption question,'. 
court held: "An ordinance dealing with the same subject as a 
statute is invalid only if prohibited by the statute or ~~~ 
therewith." (93 P. 2d at 673.) And in answering whether the 
ordinance was "prohibited by the statute or inconsistent ther: 
the court cited Section 57-7-6, Revised Statutes of Utah 19ii 
the proposition that nothing in the then state traffic code e: 
prohibits cities from passing ordinances directed against ~r 
driving. Section 57-7-6 provided in part: 
Local authorities, except as expressly 
authorized, shall have no power or authority 
to alter any of the regulations declared in 
this chapter, or to enact or enforce any 
other rule or regulations contrary to the 
provisions of this chapter ..... . 
-12-
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Compared to former Section 57-7-6, our present 
Section 41-6-16, U.C.A., (1953), is express and clear enabling 
legislation authorizing cities to prohibit driving under the 
influence of alcohol or intoxicants and to punish reckless 
driving. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent had authority, under several state statutes, to 
pass an ordinance controlling driving while under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor. The enactment of Section 41-6-43 just 
put statutory language to the power cities already had as the 
Kusse case showed. The repeal of Section 41-6-43 only eliminated 
the language but not the authority. Cities went back to where 
they were before Section 41-6-43 was enacted and drew their power 
from the general state statutes. 
Further, the re-enactment of Section 41-6-43 at the next 
session following its repeal, along with the reasoning of the 
second Allred decision, clearly shows the legislature did not 
wish to pre-empt the field. Therefore, Respondent urges this 
Court to uphold the verdict and judgment of the Trial and 
-13-
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Appellate Courts and rule that Layton Municipal Code Section 
41-6-44 is valid. 
;"~»-
c. BRUCE BARTON 
Attorney for Respondent 
437 N. Wasatch Drive 
Layton, Utah 84041 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Brief of Respon~m 
was duly served on counsel for the Appellant, TOM JONES, 
211 East 300 South, Suite 219, Salt LakeCity, Utah 84111, by 
hand delivering two (2) copies thereof this ~;/~day of 
December, 1979. 
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STATE OF "l7TAH 
STATE CAPITOL SALT L..AKE. CITY 64114 
t801l 533-5261 
Mr. B. H. Harris 
Cache County Attorney 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Re: 78-173 
Dear Mr. Harris: 
UoncHT n. IL\..XSE~ 
ATTO~NEY GENERAL. 
~IxcuAEL I~. DE.\..:'n.::u 
DEPUTY ATIORN EY GENERAL 
June 7, 1978 
In response to your letter of June 2, 1978, we have found 
that H.B. No. 18 of the 1978 Budget Session did in fact repeal Section 
41-6-43, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Notwithstanding this repealer, 
1·1e are of the opinion that city attorneys still have authority to 
prosecute the driving under the influence of alcohol cases and other 
offenses involving traffic if the ordinances are identical to or 
consistent with state statutes. We can find no legislative intent 
in the revision of many portions of the traffic code to restrict 
municipal pO\vers 1-ihich have been deemed necessary since statehood. 
Section 10-8-30, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, (enacted in 1898) 
is still in effect and has not been repealed in our opinion. As this 
section is construed by Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 U.133, 93 P.2d 671, 
it is clear that the grant of power by tt:e state to municipalities has 
and does include the pol'ler to regulate traffic by ordinance notwith-
standing the adoption of statutes on the same subject. The limitation, 
referred to in the preceeding paragraph is that the ordinance must be 
consistent 1·1ith the statutory plan or plans for regulation, and for 
example, could not provide greater penalties than those set out by 
statute. 
The cities may of course prosecute violations of valid 
ordinances. 
JPM:hk 
Cc: F. L. Gunnell 
171 East lst North 
Logan, Utah 
Mr. Phil Palmer -15-
City Prosecutor 
~·1etropol itan Hall of Justice 
-~P!)E:\DIX " . .\" 
Very truly yours, 
JOSEPH P. McCARTHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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